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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved remarkable
success in various tasks (e.g., image classification, speech recognition,
and natural language processing). However, researches have shown
that DNN models are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which cause
incorrect predictions by adding imperceptible perturbations into normal
inputs. Studies on adversarial examples in image domain have been
well investigated, but in texts the research is not enough, let alone a
comprehensive survey in this field. In this paper, we aim at presenting a
comprehensive understanding of adversarial attacks and corresponding
mitigation strategies in texts. Specifically, we first give a taxonomy of
adversarial attacks and defenses in texts from the perspective of differ-
ent natural language processing (NLP) tasks, and then introduce how to
build a robust DNN model via testing and verification. Finally, we discuss
the existing challenges of adversarial attacks and defenses in texts and
present the future research directions in this emerging field.
Index Terms—Adversarial attack and defense, Adversarial example,
Deep neural networks, Testing and verification.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, DNNs have shown their power in addressing
masses of significant problems in various areas, such as
computer vision [1], [2], audio [3], [4], and natural language
processing [5], [6]. Due to their great success, DNN-based
systems are widely deployed in the physical world, includ-
ing many security-critical areas [7]–[11]. However, Szegedy
et al. [12] first found an interesting fact that crafted inputs by
adding imperceptible perturbations could easily fool DNNs.
These modified inputs are called adversarial examples,
which can bring potential security threats to DNN-based
systems. Therefore, they have become a hot issue in arti-
ficial intelligence and security in recent years, and related
research has increased dramatically. Recently, adversarial
examples are found in many fields, varying from image to
other domains. Studies show that sign recognition system
[13], object recognition system [14], audio recognition or
control system [15]–[17], malware detection system [18],
[19], and sentiment analysis system [20] are all vulnerable
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to adversarial examples. Figure 1 is an adversarial attack on
sentiment analysis API of ParallelDots1 and the adversarial
example we use comes from the work of [21]. In Figure 1, we
can see that the prediction results change from negative to
positive when the word ‘I’ in the original sample is replaced
by ‘Excellent’.
Fig. 1: Attack on sentiment analysis API of ParallelDots: the
upper and lower figures correspond to the original input
and the adversarial example respectively.
In NLP, DNNs are widely employed in many funda-
mental tasks like text classification, machine translation,
and question answering, but these DNN-based systems
also suffer significant performance degradation in facing
adversarial examples. Papernot et al. [21] first point that
attackers can generate adversarial examples by adding
noises into texts, which can make classifiers misclassify.
Then, an arm begins between adversarial example attack
and defense in texts, leading to many studies in this field.
These researches mainly concentrate on generating effective
adversarial examples and introduce corresponding defense
strategies. Some of them [22], [23] propose the black-box
1. https://www.paralleldots.com
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2TABLE 1: Adversarial attacks in NLP
NLP tasks researches of adversarial
attacks
classification [20]–[26], [31]–[33]
reading comprehension [27]
natural language inference [28], [34]
machine translation [29], [30]
answering question [35]
argument reasoning comprehension [36]
link prediction [37]
attacks and the main object is the text classification system
[20], [22]–[26]. In addition, reading comprehension [27],
natural language inference (NLI) [28] and machine trans-
lation systems [29], [30] are also vulnerable to adversarial
examples. Table 1 summarizes existing works on adversarial
attacks in different NLP tasks.
Adversarial examples in texts also bring some potential
security concerns to users, as many text-related systems
based on DNNs are deployed for providing services (like
Figure 1). In the physical world, users are prone to acquire
suggestions by reading reviews of products or services
when shopping, eating or watching films. Hence, some apps
provide recommendation services to users according to the
historical reviews with sentiment analysis techniques [38].
The corresponding items with recommendation scores will
be given at the same time. The higher the score is, the
more likely it is to be accepted by users. Unfortunately,
attackers could generate adversarial examples based on
users’ real comments to smear competitors or give malicious
recommendations for shoddy goods. The recommendation
scores of specified products could be manually controlled
by intentionally crafted reviews. Besides, systems for de-
tecting malicious information [39]–[41] are also under the
threat of adversarial examples. Therefore, researchers have
paid much attention to the security problem caused by
adversarial examples [42], [43]. Numerous works study the
adversarial attacks and defenses, aiming at exploring what
adversarial examples are [12], [44]–[46], why they exist, how
they infect the behavior of DNN models, and how to solve
this security problem. We count the number of adversarial
example papers in recent years which is shown in Figure 2.
The last statistical time is to the end of November in 2019.
In Figure 2, the orange one represents studies on adversarial
texts, and the blue one stands for the papers collected by
Carlini [47] about adversarial examples in image, audio,
text, etc. We can see that the number of related publications
is increasing sharply in the past three years representing
great concern by researchers. But researches in texts are rare
as a frontier, and more attention needs to be paid to this
aspect.
Due to the security and privacy issues caused by adver-
sarial examples, it is of great significance to review their
rapid developments. There have been several surveys in
image domain [45], [48]–[52], but few in texts [53]–[55]. The
works in [53], [54] are partly related to adversarial texts.
The remaining one [55] compares attack methods in image
domain and describes how adversarial attacks are imple-
mented in texts. These surveys mainly focus on adversarial
attacks and defenses, but there is not a systematic review for
building a robust DNN model. In this paper, we explain the
Fig. 2: Publications of adversarial examples in DNNs
existence of adversarial examples and analyze how to attack
and defend in various NLP tasks, aiming at systematically
understanding adversarial examples towards building a
robust DNN model in texts. The major contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
• The paper presents a comprehensive survey of ad-
versarial examples in texts, which are published in
different areas like security, artificial intelligence, nat-
ural language processing, and software engineering.
• We present the adversarial attacks and defenses in
texts by considering specific NLP tasks and introduce
various metrics in measuring adversarial texts. We
also discuss how to improve the robustness of DNNs
via testing and verification to build a robust DNN
model in texts.
• We observe that there is a pronounced imbalance
in the distribution of research efforts: among the 47
papers in texts we collected, three of them tackle
testing and verification, only one paper specializes
in defense, and the remaining is about attacks. Ad-
ditionally, there is only one paper study the factor of
speed in adversarial examples.
• We answer an essential question that which attack or
defense method is better via comparing some repre-
sentative works with the same datasets. We present
some general observations of adversarial examples
and discuss the existing challenges. Finally, we also
introduce some feasible directions with the propose
of facilitating and stimulating further research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we first
give some related knowledge about adversarial examples in
section 2. In section 3, we review the adversarial attacks for
text classification. Attacks on other NLP tasks are in section
4. The researches about defense are introduced in sections 5
and 6. One of them is on existing defense methods in texts.
The other is about how to improve the robustness of DNNs
from another point. The discussion and conclusion are in
sections 7 and 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a brief introduction on DNNs,
followed by formula descriptions, interpretation of adver-
sarial examples, general classification, evaluation, and cor-
responding datasets in texts.
32.1 Deep Neural Networks
The deep neural network is a network topology, which
can learn high-level features with more complexity and
abstraction than general neural networks [56]. A DNN
model generally consists of an input layer, several hidden
layers, and an output layer. Each of them is made up of
multiple cells. Additionally, a softmax layer is usually added
to DNN models for classification by mapping outputs to a
probability distribution. Figure 3 shows some DNN models,
including recurrent neural network (RNN), long-short term
memory (LSTM) [57], and gated recurrent unit (GRU) [58],
which can be used in text and image domains.
P(y = 0 | x)
P(y = 1 | x)
P(y = 2 | x)
a. Recurrent Neural Network
P(y = 0 | x)
P(y = 1 | x)
P(y = 2 | x)
b. Long-Short Term Memory
P(y = 0 | x)
P(y = 1 | x)
P(y = 2 | x)
c. Gated Recurrent Unit
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Fig. 3: Some frequently used DNN models in texts
But different from the use of these models in image
domain, an extra embedding layer is added to them for
processing data in texts, because the raw texts need to be
converted to vectors before learning. This process is called
word embedding, aiming at representing the ideal semantic
space of words in a real-valued continuous vector space
[59]. The commonly used embedding methods are one-
hot, n-gram [60], and word2vec [61]. One-hot encoding is
a technique whose dimension is equal to the size of the
whole vocabulary, thus often resulting in large, very sparse
vectors [62]. An n-gram model is a kind of probabilistic
language model to predict next word in the form of previous
words, which lacks long range dependency. Word2vec offers
the best representation within a low dimensional semantic
space learning from raw texts [63]. It includes two archi-
tectures: continuous bag-of-words (CBOW) and skip-gram.
Word2vec is the most frequently used method for word
embedding at present.
2.2 Formula Descriptions
In order to have a more intuitive understanding of the
definitions, we give some formula descriptions about DNN,
adversarial examples, and robustness of models.
DNN. A DNN can be presented as the function F : X →
Y , which maps from an input set X to Y . Y is the label set of
k classes like {1, 2, . . . , k}. For a sample x ∈ X , it is correctly
classified by F to the truth label y, i.e., F (x) = y.
Adversarial Examples. An attacker aims at adding small
perturbations ε in x to generate adversarial example x’, so
that F (x’) = y’(y 6= y’), where ‖ ε ‖< δ. δ is a threshold to
limit the size of perturbations. Meanwhile, a good x’ should
not only fool F , but also be imperceptible to humans, robust
to transformations as well as resilient to existing defenses
depending on the adversarial goals [64]. Hence, constraint
conditions (e.g., semantic similarity) are appended to make
x’ be indistinguishable from x.
Robustness. A robust DNN should not change its output
as a result of small changes in its input [65]. Hence, the
prediction of the adversarial example x’ should be y rather
than y′ in a robust model, i.e., F (x′) = y. Defense methods
for enhancing the robustness of models are to increase the
tolerance of ε, making DNNs perform properly.
2.3 Interpretation of Adversarial Examples
Since the problem of adversarial examples is so serious, a
question arises: why adversarial examples exist in DNNs?
Researchers have been exploring the existence of adversarial
examples since they were discovered. Nowadays, there are
two main points about their existence. One is due to the
linear structure of DNNs, which can lead to false predictions
with a high probability. Goodfellow et al. [44] claimed that
the primary cause of adversarial examples was the linear
nature of DNNs. Although the non-linear activation func-
tions are the main parts of DNNs, they are linear in a sense.
Some of the main activation functions are shown in Figure
4, including tanh, sigmoid, relu [66], and ELU2 [67]. In
Figure 4, we can see that these functions are very piecewise
linear. Besides, there also exist other linear structures, such
as the connection of each layer and convolution calculation.
A defect of the linear structure is that classification is still
possible as it moves away from the decision boundaries,
even though there is no training data. However, false predic-
tions are usually made in these places, so that the presence
of adversarial examples may be for this reason. The other
interpretation is that adversarial examples are generated
based on non-robust features of the data. Ilyas et al. [68]
claimed, “adversarial vulnerability is a direct result of our
models sensitivity to well-generalizing features in the data.”
Through a series of experiments, they draw the conclusion
that adversarial examples are not bugs, but features. The
features for prediction can be classified as robust and non-
robust, if they exist in standard classification tasks. Both
of them are used for predicting the truth label which is
pre-defined. But small perturbations can be added on non-
robust features to make the final prediction incorrect. Hence,
adversarial examples appear no matter in image, text, or
other domains.
2.4 General Classifications of Adversarial Examples
Figure 5 is a general classification of adversarial attacks
and defenses. The classification information is summarized
from the relevant literature, including image, text, video,
and audio.
2.4.1 Taxonomy of Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial attacks can be conducted in white-box and
black-box scenarios. In the white-box scenario, adversaries
2. Relu and ELU refer to rectified linear units and exponential linear
units respectively. ELU is designed for alleviating the vanishing gradi-
ent problem of relu.
4(a) Tanh (b) Sigmoid
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Fig. 4: Some of the main activation functions in DNNs
have full access to target models and they can obtain ex-
cellent adversarial examples by the use of models’ architec-
tures, parameters, and weights, which usually perform bet-
ter than those in black-box attacks. In the black-box scenario,
adversaries have no or little knowledge (e.g., logits3) about
target models. They generally train substitution models and
utilize the transferability [44], [69] of adversarial examples
to carry out a black-box attack. Besides, there is another
way to conduct a black-box attack if target models can be
queried. For querying-based methods, adversaries modify
the inputs by observing the outputs after each query, and
then the process is repeated until adversarial examples are
obtained.
According to the purpose of adversaries, adversarial at-
tacks can be divided into targeted and non-targeted attacks.
In the targeted attack, the generated adversarial example
x’ is purposefully classified as class t, which is the target
of an adversary. This process mainly relies on increasing
the confidence score (i.e., the logit or the output of softmax
layer) of class t. In the non-targeted attack, the adversary
only aims at fooling the model. The result y’ can be any
class except for y. Contrary to the targeted attack, non-
targeted attack operates via reducing the confidence score
of the correct class y.
In texts, there is another way to classify attacks by
adversarial texts, which is shown in Figure 6. According
to the modified objects, they can be divided into character-
level , word-level, and sentence-level attacks. The character-
level attack operates on the characters, including letters, spe-
cial symbols, and numbers. Different from character-level
attack, the word-level attack modifies words by synonyms,
typos, genre specific keywords, etc. Currently, the way of
sentence-level attack is to add crafted sentences into the
inputs like the works of [26], [27].
2.4.2 Taxonomy of Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks
Inspired by [70], the goals of defense are to protect DNN-
based systems from adversarial attacks and to evaluate
the robustness of these systems in the worst-case. For the
former, defenders try to detect adversarial examples and
bar them from the DNN models. The latter is that defenders
have trained the models through various ways to enhance
3. Logit is the input of a softmax layer.
their robustness for making the attack fail. Accordingly, de-
fense can be divided into detection and model enhancement.
The general way of detection is to detect the inputs. The
other is achieved by enhancing the robustness of DNNs
in training process, including adversarial training, chang-
ing the loss functions of models, testing, and verification
methods. In texts, spelling check and adversarial training
are two major ways to defend against adversarial attacks.
The spelling check is a special detection method in NLP and
the other is a general approach used in image, text, audio,
etc.
2.5 Evaluation of Adversarial Examples on Effective-
ness
The performance evaluation of adversarial examples is
an open-ended question, which reflects the ability to fool
DNNs. Researchers have used different standards to eval-
uate their performance. As far as we know, researchers
generally evaluate the attacks on target models by accuracy
rate or error rate.
• accuracy rate: It refers to the ratio of correct discrim-
ination on the inputs. The lower the accuracy rate is,
the more effective the adversarial examples are.
• error rate: It is the ratio of incorrect discrimination
on the inputs, which is opposite to the accuracy rate.
The higher the error rate is, the more effective the
adversarial examples are.
Some researchers prefer to use the difference between
the accuracy before and after attacks, because it shows the
effect more intuitively. These evaluation methods are also
used in defense.
2.6 Metric on Imperceptibility
In adversarial attacks, the basic assumption is that adver-
sarial examples should be invisible to human eyes. A lot of
metrics are adopted for measuring the perceptual similarity
between adversarial examples and the original ones, like L0
[71]–[73], L2 [73]–[76], and L∞ [12], [44], [76]–[79] in image
domain. Unfortunately, these metrics cannot be directly
applied to texts. In this section, we first give some metrics in
image domain, and then we present some metrics in texts.
2.6.1 Metrics in image domain
In image domain, most recent studies adopt Lp distance to
quantify the imperceptibility and similarity between adver-
sarial examples and the original ones. The generalized term
for Lp distance is shown in formula (1):
‖4c‖p = p
√√√√ n∑
i=1
|c′i − ci|p (1)
where 4c represents the perturbations. c′i and ci are the
i-th factors in n-dimensional vectors ~c′ and ~c respectively.
Formula (1) represents a series of distances, where p could
be 0, 2, ∞, and so on. Specially, when p is equal to zero,
‖4c‖0=
∑
bool(ci 6= 0). bool is a logical function with 0 or 1
value. In image domain, L0, L2, and L∞ are the three most
frequently used norms to measure adversarial examples.
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Fig. 5: General categorization of adversarial attacks and defenses
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• L0 distance evaluates the number of changed pixels
before and after modifications. It seems like edit dis-
tance, but it does not directly work in texts. Results
of altered words in texts are varied. Some of them
are similar to original words and the others may be
contrary, even though the L0 distances of them are
equal.
• L2 represents the Euclidean distance. The original
Euclidean distance is the beeline from one point
to another in Euclidean space. As the mapping of
image, text, or others to this space, it acts as a metric
to calculate the similarity between two objects, which
are represented as the vectors.
• L∞ distance measures the maximum change, which
is shown in formula (2):
‖4c‖∞ = max(|c′1 − c1|, . . . , |c′n − cn|) (2)
max is a function to choose the maximum factor.
Although L∞ distance is regarded as the optimal
distance metric in image, but it may fail in texts. The
altered words may not exist in pre-trained dictionary.
Hence, they are considered to be unknown words
and their word vectors are also unknown. As a result,
the L∞ distance is hard to calculate.
There are other metrics (e.g., structural similarity [80],
perturbation sensitivity [81]) which are typical methods for
image. They cannot be directly used in texts either because
of the different data types, which result in different gen-
eration methods of adversarial examples. Hence, available
metrics are needed in texts to guarantee the quality of
adversarial examples.
2.6.2 Metrics in texts
Apart from imperceptibility, a good adversarial example
in texts must convey the same semantic meaning with the
original one, so that metrics are required to ensure this case.
In the following part, we describe some metrics used in the
pertinent studies on adversarial texts.
Euclidean Distance. For two given word vectors ~m =
(m1,m2, . . . ,mk) and ~n = (n1, n2, . . . , nk), the Euclidean
distance of them is shown in formula (3):
D (~m,~n)=
√
(m1−n1)2+. . .+(mk−nk)2 (3)
where mi and ni are the i-th factors in the k-dimensional
vectors respectively. The lower the distance is, the more
similar they are. But Euclidean distance is more frequently
used in image domain [73]–[76] with a generalized term
called L2 norm or L2 distance.
Cosine Distance. Cosine distance is also a computational
method for semantic similarity. It calculates the cosine value
of the angle between two vectors. Compared with Euclidean
distance, the cosine distance pays more attention to the
difference between the directions of two vectors. The more
consistent their directions are, the more similar they are. For
two given word vectors ~m and ~n, the cosine similarity of
them is shown in formula (4):
D (~m,~n) =
~m · ~n
‖m‖ · ‖n‖ =
k∑
i=1
mi × ni√
k∑
i=1
(mi)2 ×
√
k∑
i=1
(ni)2
(4)
Jaccard Similarity Coefficient. For two given sets A and
B, their Jaccard similarity coefficient J(A,B) is shown in
formula (5):
J (A,B) = |A ∩B|/|A ∪B| (5)
where 0 ≤ J(A,B) ≤ 1. It means that the closer the
value of J(A,B) is to 1, the more similar they are. In texts,
intersectionA∩B refers to similar words in the samples and
union A ∪B is all words without duplication.
Word Movers Distance (WMD). WMD [82] is a variation
of Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [83]. It is used to measure
the dissimilarity between two text documents, relying on the
6traveling distance from embedded words of one document
to another. The lower the value of WMD is, the more similar
the two texts are.
Edit Distance. Edit distance is a way to measure the
minimum modifications by turning a string to another. The
lower it is, the more similar the two strings are. It can
be applied to computational biology and natural language
processing. Levenshtein distance [84] is also known as edit
distance with insertion, deletion, replacement operations in
the work of [22].
These metrics are applied to different objects. Among
them, Euclidean distance, cosine distance, and WMD are
used on vectors. Adversarial examples and the original ones
in texts are transformed into vectors, and then these three
methods are applied to calculate the distance between the
vectors. On the contrary, Jaccard similarity coefficient and
edit distance are directly used on text inputs without the
need to convert raw texts to vectors.
Particularly, Michel et al. [85] proposed a natural crite-
rion for adversarial texts on sequence-to-sequence models.
This work focuses on evaluating the semantic equivalence
between adversarial examples and the original ones. Exper-
imental results show that strict constraints are useful in this
work for keeping meaning-preserving, but whether it is bet-
ter than the above metrics still needs further confirmation.
2.7 Datasets in Texts
To make data more accessible to those who need it, we
collect some commonly used public datasets in NLP tasks
and give some brief introductions about them. Table 2 is
their applications in different NLP tasks and Table 3 is some
other datasets used in research works.
AG’s News4: AG’s News is a set of news with more than
one million articles and it is gathered from over 2,000 news
sources by an academic news search engine named Come-
ToMyHead. The provided DB version and XML version can
be downloaded for any non-commercial use.
DBPedia Ontology5: DBPedia is a dataset with struc-
tured content from the information created in various Wiki-
media projects. It has over 68 classes with 2,795 different
properties. Now there are more than 4 million instances
included in this dataset.
Amazon Review6: The Amazon review dataset has
nearly 35 million reviews spanning Jun 1995 to March
2013, including product and user information, ratings, and
a plaintext review. It is collected by over 6 million users in
more than 2 million products and categorized into 33 classes
with the size ranging from KB to GB.
Yahoo! Answers7: The corpus contains 4 million ques-
tions and their answers, which can be easily used in the
question-answer system. Besides that, a topic classification
dataset is also constructed with some main classes.
Yelp Reviews8: The provided data is made available by
Yelp to enable researchers or students to develop academic
4. http://www.di.unipi.it/∼gulli/AG corpus of news articles.
html
5. https://wiki.dbpedia.org/services-resources/ontology
6. http://snap.stanford.edu/data/web-Amazon.html
7. https://sourceforge.net/projects/yahoodataset/
8. https://www.yelp.com/dataset/download
projects. It contains 4.7 million user reviews with the types
of JSON files and SQL files.
Movie Review (MR)9: MR is a labeled dataset concern-
ing sentiment polarity, subjective rating and sentences with
subjectivity status or polarity. Probably because it is labeled
by manual works, the size of this dataset is smaller than
others, with a maximum of dozens of MB.
MPQA Opinion Corpus10: The Multi-Perspective Ques-
tion Answering (MPQA) Opinion Corpus is collected from a
wide variety of news sources and annotated for opinions or
other private states. Three different versions are available to
people by the MITRE Corporation. The higher the version
is, the richer the contents are.
Internet Movie Database (IMDB)11: IMDB is crawled
from the Internet, including 50,000 positive and negative
reviews. The average length of the review is nearly 200
words. It is usually used for sentiment classification, in-
cluding more data than other similar datasets. IMDB also
contains the additional unlabeled data, raw text, and already
processed data.
SNLI Corpus12: The Stanford Natural Language Infer-
ence (SNLI) Corpus is a collection with manually labeled
data mainly for natural language inference (NLI) task. There
are nearly five hundred thousand sentence pairs written
by humans in a grounded context. More details about this
corpus can be seen in the work of [93].
TABLE 2: Applications of some commonly used public
datasets
dataset application in the
work
task
AG’s News [22], [24] classification
DBPedia [22], [25], [26] classification
Amazon Review [22] classification
Yahoo! Answers [22] classification
Yelp Reviews [22] classification
Movie Review [20], [25], [26] sentiment analysis
MPQA [26] classification
IMDB [20], [23], [25],
[31], [32]
sentiment analysis
SNLI Corpus [23], [28] textual entailment, NLI
3 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS FOR CLASSIFICATION
IN TEXTS
The majority of recent adversarial attacks in texts are related
to classification tasks. Hence, we first introduce the adver-
sarial attacks with this aspect. In this section, we divide
them into two parts based on the desire of attackers. Tech-
nical details and corresponding comments of each attack
described below are given to make them more clear to
readers.
9. http://www.cs.cornell.edu/people/pabo/movie-review-data/
10. http://mpqa.cs.pitt.edu/
11. http://ai.stanford.edu/∼amaas/data/sentiment/
12. https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/snli/
13. http://riejohnson.com/cnn data.html
14. https://stanford-qa.com
15. http://www.nyu.edu/projects/bowman/multinli/
16. http://movieqa.cs.toronto.edu/leaderboard/
17. https://www.cs.uic.edu/∼liub/FBS/sentiment-analysis.html
18. http://www.daviddlewis.com/resources/testcollections/
reuters21578/
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dataset application in the work task source
Enron Spam [22] spam e-mail detection -
Twitter dataset [31] gender prediction [86]
Elec13 [25] sentiment analysis [87]
RCV113 [25] classification [87]
FCE-public [25] grammatical error detection -
Stanford Sentiment Treebank [24], [88] sentiment analysis -
Stanford Question Answering Dataset14 [27] reading comprehension [89]
MultiNLI15 [28] natural language inference [90]
MovieQA dataset16 [91] attacking reading system [92]
Customer review dataset17 [26] sentiment analysis -
Reuters18 [32] classification -
3.1 Non-targeted Attacks for Classification
In this part, the following studies are all non-targeted at-
tacks in texts. For this kind of attacks, attackers do not care
about the category of misclassification. The non-targeted
attacks can be subdivided into FGSM-based, optimization-
based, and importance-based ones. Among them, the
importance-based attacks are those by modifying important
words, which highly affect the prediction results.
3.1.1 FGSM-based Approach
Studies on adversarial examples in image domain are more
active than those in texts. Hence, researchers try to employ
approaches in image domain to texts and achieve better
results. They propose some efficient approaches based on
FGSM, which are described below.
As far as we know, Papernot et al. [21] first studied the
problem of adversarial examples in texts and contributed to
producing adversarial input sequences. The authors lever-
aged computational graph unfolding [94] to evaluate the
forward derivative [71], which is related to the embedding
inputs of word sequences. The results were then calculated
by FGSM to find the adversarial perturbations. However,
the corresponding vectors of modified words might not
exist. To solve this mapping problem, they set up a specific
dictionary to select words for replacing the original ones. Al-
though their adversarial sequences can make LSTM model
produce wrong predictions, the words in input sequences
are randomly chosen for substitution, so that the probability
of grammatical errors in adversarial examples is very high.
Similar to [21], Samanta et al. [31] utilized the concept
of FGSM to evaluate the important or salient words, which
deeply affected the results of classification when they were
removed. Then, three modification strategies (i.e., insertion,
replacement, and deletion) were introduced to craft top k
words with highest importance, where k was a threshold.
Except for the deletion strategy, both insertion and replace-
ment on top k words required an additional dictionary
for substitution. Thus, the authors established a pool of
candidates for each word in the experiment, including syn-
onyms, typos, and type-specific keywords. However, this
process consumes a great deal of time and there may be no
candidate pool for some top k words in the actual inputs.
This method is also an importance-based approach.
3.1.2 Optimization-based Approach
Different from other methods, Sato et al. [25] operated in the
embedding space of inputs and proposed a method named
iAdv-Text. Its core process could be seen as an optimization
problem, which was to jointly minimize objection function
JiAdvT (D,W ) on entire training dataset D with parameters
W. The optimization procedure is shown in formula (6):
JiAdvT (D,W ) = 1|D| argminW {
∑
(Xˆ,Yˆ )∈D
`(Xˆ, Yˆ ,W )+
λ
∑
(Xˆ,Yˆ )∈D
αiAdvT }
(6)
where Xˆ and Yˆ are the inputs and labels respectively. λ
is a hyper-parameter to balance the two loss functions.
`(Xˆ, Yˆ ,W ) is the loss function of individual training sample
(Xˆ, Yˆ ) in D. αiAdvT is a maximization process to find the
worst case weights of the direction vectors. Its formula is
shown in (7):
αiAdvT = argmax
α,‖α‖≤
{`(~w +
|V |∑
k=1
akdk, Yˆ ,W )} (7)
where
∑|V |
k=1 akdk is the perturbation generated from each
input on its word embedding vector ~w.  is a hyper-
parameter to control adversarial perturbation. ak is the k-
th factor of a |V |-dimensional word embedding vector α.
dk is the k-th factor of a |V |-dimensional direction vector ~d,
which is a mapping from one word to another in embedding
space. Since αiAdvT in formula (7) was difficult to calculate,
the authors used formula (8) instead:
αiAdvT =
g
‖g‖2 , g = ∇α`(~w +
|V |∑
k=1
akdk, Yˆ ,W ) (8)
iAdv-Text restricts the direction of perturbations to find
a substitution, which is in a pre-defined vocabulary rather
than an unknown word. Meanwhile, the authors also use
cosine similarity to select better perturbations, so that the
readability and semantic similarity are well kept.
Similarly, Gong et al. [32] also searched for adversarial
perturbations in embedding space. Even though WMD is
used by the authors to measure the similarity between
adversarial examples and the original ones, the readability
of generated adversarial examples seems worse than those
in iAdv-Text.
3.1.3 Importance-based Approach
Unlike previous white-box methods [21], [31], little attention
is paid to black-box attacks with adversarial texts. Gao et
8al. [22] proposed DeepWordBug to generate adversarial ex-
amples in black-box scenario. The whole process is divided
into two stages. The first stage was to determine which
important words to change, and the second stage was to
create imperceptible perturbations for fooling the models.
The calculation process for the first stage was shown in
formula (9):
CS(xi) =[F (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi)− F (x1, x2, . . . , xi−1)]+
λ[F (xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)− F (xi+1, . . . , xn)] (9)
where CS(xi) represents the importance score of the i-th
word in the input (x1, . . . , xn), which was evaluated by the
function F . λ is a hyper-parameter. In second stage, similar
modifications like swap, flip, deletion, and insertion were
applied to manipulate the characters of important words.
Meanwhile, the authors used edit distance to preserve the
readability of adversarial examples. A variant method was
proposed by Wang et al. [95] to attack a classification system
with Chinese data, which showed that adversarial examples
could be other languages, not limited to English.
Li et al. [20] proposed an attack framework TextBugger
for generating adversarial examples, which could mislead
the deep learning-based text understanding system in both
black-box and white-box settings. In the white-box scenario,
Jacobian matrix J was used to calculate the importance of
each word as follows:
Cxi = JF (i,y) =
∂Fy(x)
∂xi
(10)
where Fy(·) represents the confidence value of class y.
Cxi is the important score of the i-th word in the input
x. Then, similar modification strategies like DeepWordBug
[22] are used to generate both character-level and word-
level adversarial examples. In the black-box scenario, the
authors segmented documents into sequences, and then
they queried the target model to filter out sentences with
different predicted labels from the original ones. The odd se-
quences were sorted in an inverse order by their confidence
score. Subsequently, the important words were calculated
by removing operation in formula (11):
Cxi =Fy (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi, xi+1, . . . , xn)
− Fy (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) (11)
The final modification process was the same as that in the
white-box setting.
3.2 Targeted Attacks for Classification
For targeted attacks, attackers purposefully control the cat-
egory of outputs which they desire and generate semantic-
preservation adversarial examples. Currently, the costs of
targeted attacks are larger than non-targeted ones due to
their special needs. In the following part, we describe some
representative targeted attacks in recent works.
3.2.1 FGSM-based Approach
Different from works in [21], [31], Liang et al. [26] first
demonstrated that FGSM could not be directly applied
to texts. Because the input space of texts is discrete, and
that of image data is continuous. Continuous images have
tolerance of tiny perturbations, but texts are not. Instead,
the authors only utilized FGSM to determine what, where,
and how to insert, remove, and modify the inputs. They
conducted two kinds of attacks in different scenarios and
used the natural language watermarking [96] technique
to make generated adversarial examples compromise their
utilities.
The authors carried out adversarial attacks in both
white-box and black-box settings. In the white-box scenario,
they defined the conceptions of hot training phrases and
hot sample phrases. These two objects were both obtained
by leveraging the back-propagation algorithm to compute
the cost gradients of samples. The former one shed light
on what to insert, and the latter one implied where to
insert, remove, and modify. In the black-box scenario, the
authors used the idea of fuzzing technique [97] for reference
to obtain hot training phrases and hot sample phrases.
A core assumption was that the target model could be
queried. Samples were fed to target model, and then iso-
metric whitespace was used to substitute origin word each
time. The difference between the results before and after
modification was the deviation of each word. The larger it
was, the more significant the corresponding word was to
the classification. Hence, hot training phrases were the most
frequent words in the set of inputs, which consisted of the
largest deviation words for each training sample. And hot
sample phrases were the words with largest deviation for
every test sample.
3.2.2 Optimization-based Approach
Like one pixel attack [72], a similar method named HotFlip
was proposed by Ebrahimi et al. [24]. HotFlip was a white-
box attack in texts, which relied on an atomic flip operation
to swap one character with another by gradient computa-
tion. The flip operation was represented by formula (12):
~vijb =(~0, . . . ; (~0, . . . (0, 0, . . . , 0,−1, 0, . . . , 1, 0)j ,
. . . ,~0)i;~0, . . .)
(12)
The formula (12) means that the j-th character of i-th word in
an example is changed from a to b, which are both characters
at a-th and b-th places in the alphabet. -1 and 1 in formula
(12) are the corresponding positions for a and b respectively.
The change from directional derivative along this vector is
calculated to find the biggest increase in the loss J(x, y). The
process of calculation is shown in formula (13):
max∇xJ(x, y)T · ~vijb = max
ijb
∂J (b)
∂xij
− ∂J
(a)
∂xij
(13)
where xij is a one-hot vector, which denote the j-th character
of i-th word. y refers to the corresponding label vector. T
is a transpose function. Apart from character-level attack,
HotFlip could also be used on word-level by different
modifications. Although HotFlip performs well, only a few
successful adversarial examples are generated with one or
two flips under the strict constraints, so that it is not suitable
for a large-scale experiment.
A derivative method DISTFLIP was proposed by Gil
et al. [33]. They distilled the knowledge of the procedure
in HotFlip, which was used to train a black-box model.
Through the training model, the authors generated adver-
sarial examples to conduct a black-box attack. This method
9performs well than HotFlip on a toxicity classifier [98], and
its run-time in generating adversarial examples is ten times
faster than HotFlip. But whether this method can distill the
knowledge of any white-box attack remains to be verified.
Considering the limitation of gradient optimization [21],
[24], [41] in the black-box setting, Alzantot et al. [23] pro-
posed an optimization method based on genetic algorithm
[99], [100]. The authors randomly selected words from the
inputs and computed their nearest neighbors by Euclidean
Distance in GloVe embedding space [101]. These nearest
neighbors were filtered based on language model scores
[102] to make them suitable for the surroundings, so that
only high-ranking words with the highest scores were kept.
The substitutions which would maximize the probability of
target label were picked from the remaining words. At the
same time, above operations were conducted several times
to get a generation. If the predicted label of a modified
sample in a generation was not the target, two samples
were randomly chosen each time as parents to generated the
next generation, and then the same process was repeated on
the next generation. This optimization procedure is to find
a successful attack by genetic algorithm. In this method,
random selection words in the sequence to substitute are
full of uncertainty. These substitutions may be meaningless,
even though the target label is changed.
3.2.3 Summary of Adversarial Attacks for Classification
These attacks for classification are either popular or rep-
resentative ones in recent studies. Some main attributes of
them are summarized in Table 4. We can see that the ma-
jority of white-box attacks are related to gradients in Table
4. Gradient-based optimization methods are widely used in
image with many variants (e.g., [106], [107]), which can also
be applied to texts. But there exist some shortcomings by
the use of gradients, which are the vanishing and exploding
gradient problems [108], [109], and limitations of the access
to target models. Meanwhile, gradient masking [110] can
make gradients useless in some cases, leading to failure in
gradient-based methods. Even though gradient masking is
proved to be a failed defense, gradient-based methods are
not as effective as we think.
Besides, we have reviewed many adversarial attacks
here, but how they perform and which one is better are
still unclear. To make a good comparison on these attacks,
we analyze and choose the same datasets they use. In Table
2 and Table 3, we can see that IMDB, DBpedia, and MR are
three commonly used datasets. But the experimental result
of Text-fool [26] on MR is not found. Hence, comparisons
are made on IMDB and DBpedia and results are shown in
Table 5. The results of TextBugger [20] on IMDB and those
of Text-fool [26] on DBPedia are in white-box scenario. The
success rate of Text-fool is the average.  in the work of [32]
is equal to point four. Although some attacks are conducted
on several models and have both black-box and white-box
methods, we only list a good one for comparison. In Table 5,
we can see that white-box attacks are generally better than
19. https://iamtrask.github.io/2015/11/15/anyone-can-code-lstm/
20. https://github.com/keras-team/keras/blob/master/examples/
imdb lstm.py
21. https://github.com/Smerity/keras snli/blob/master/snli rnn.
py
black-box ones except for the genetic method in Alzantot
et al. [23]. This phenomenon may be related to the lack of
black-box attacks. Some of them are perhaps not worse than
the white-box. For example, black-box attacks in TextBugger
[20] reach one hundred percent of success rate on several
physical systems. On the other hand, some non-targeted
attacks perform better than targeted ones, but the compari-
son is opposite considering the average of success rate. The
optimization-based methods are much more superior than
others, mainly because of the stricter constraints than other
attacks.
Furthermore, good adversarial texts not only achieve
a high success rate to fool DNNs, but also need to have
good readability, semantic similarity, and imperceptibility.
Hence, we judge through the generated examples (in Table
6) in these methods. Modifications on texts are generally
divided into character-level, word-level, and sentence-level.
The character-level operates on the characters and the others
modify words and sentences respectively. In Table 6, the
word-level attacks with synonym seem more imperceptible
than the character-level ones, although people are robust
against misspellings [111]. But some character-level meth-
ods also perform very well like HotFlip. Generally, the more
operations there are, the easier it is to be perceived. The
more imperceptible the perturbations are, the better the
readability and semantic similarity will be.
4 ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON OTHER NLP TASKS
We have reviewed adversarial attacks for classification task
above. Next, we solve some other puzzles on adversarial
texts, such as what other kinds of NLP tasks or applications
can be attacked by adversarial examples and how they are
generated in these cases.
4.1 Attack on Reading Comprehension Systems
To explore whether reading comprehension systems are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples, Jia et al. [27] inserted ad-
versarial perturbations into paragraphs to test the systems
without changing the answers or misleading humans. They
extracted nouns and adjectives in the question and replaced
them with antonyms. Meanwhile, named entities and num-
bers were changed by the nearest word in GloVe embedding
space [101]. The modified question was transformed into a
declarative sentence as the adversarial perturbation, which
was then concatenated to the end of the original paragraph.
This process is called ADDSENT by the authors.
Another way ADDANY randomly chose words of the
sentences to craft. Compared with ADDSENT, ADDANY
does not consider the grammaticality of sentences, and it
needs to query the model several times. The core idea of
this work is to draw the attention of models on the gen-
erated sequences rather than original sequences to produce
incorrect answers. Mudrakarta et al. [35] studied adversarial
examples on question answering system, and part of their
works can strengthen the attacks proposed by Jia et al. [27].
4.2 Attack on Natural Language Inference Models
Except for reading comprehension systems [27], Minervini
et al. [28] chose the NLI systems as the target. They cast
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TABLE 4: Attributes of attacks for classification
Method White/Black
box
Targeted/Non-
targeted
Model Metric Gradient-
related
TextBugger [20] Both two Non-targeted LR,char-CNN [103],CNN [104] multiple metrics No
Papernot et al. [21] White box Non-targeted LSTM19 Yes
DeepWordBug [22] Black box Non-targeted LSTM,char-CNN [103] Edit Distance No
Alzantot et al. [23] Black box Targeted LSTM20,RNN21 Euclidean Distance No
HotFlip [24] White box Targeted CNN [104],charCNN-LSTM [105] Consine Similarity Yes
iAdv-Text [25] White box Non-targeted LSTM Consine Similarity Yes
Text-fool [26] Both two Targeted char-CNN [103] Yes
Samanta et al. [31] White box Non-targeted CNN Yes
Gong et al. [32] White box Targeted CNN Word Mover Distance(WMD) Yes
DISTFLIP [33] Black box Non-targeted GRU No
TABLE 5: Experimental results of adversarial attacks on IMDB and DBPedia
dataset method type black/white targeted/non-targeted model success rate
IMDB
TextBugger [20] importance-based white non-targeted char-CNN 86.7%
Alzantot et al. [23] optimization-based black targeted LSTM 97%
iAdv-Text [25] optimization-based white non-targeted LSTM 93.92%
Samanta et al. [31] FGSM-based white non-targeted CNN 67.45%
Gong et al. [32] optimization-based white targeted CNN 86.66%
DBPedia
DeepWordBug [22] importance-based black non-targeted LSTM 74.32%
iAdv-Text [25] optimization-based white non-targeted LSTM 99.01%
Text-fool [26] FGSM-based white targeted char-CNN 84.7%
the generation of adversarial examples as an optimization
problem to capture samples, which could bread the First-
Order Logic (FOL) constraints added in NLI. The authors
maximized the proposed inconsistency loss JI to search for
substitution sets S (i.e., adversarial examples) by using a
language model as follows:
maximize
S
JI(S) = [p(S; body)− p(S;head)]+ ,
s.t. log pL(S) ≤ τ
(14)
where [x]+ = max(0, x). pL(S) refers to the probability of
the sentences in S.
• τ : a threshold on the perplexity of generated se-
quences
• X1, . . . , Xn: the set of universally quantified vari-
ables in a rule to sequences in S
• S = {X1 → s1, . . . , Xn → sn}: a mapping from
{X1, . . . , Xn}
• p(S; body) and p(S;head): probability of the given
rule, after replacing Xi with the corresponding sen-
tence Si
• body and head: represent the premise and the con-
clusion of the NLI rules
These generated sequences are used by authors to test the
weaknesses of NLI systems.
4.3 Attack on Neural Machine Translation (NMT)
NMT is another target system attacked by Belinkov et
al. [29]. They devised adversarial examples depending on
natural and synthetic language errors, including typos, mis-
spellings, or others. Then, syntactically adversarial exam-
ples are modified by random or keyboard typo types. The
experiments are made on three different NMT systems [112],
[113], and the results show that these examples could also
effectively fool NMT systems.
Similarly, Ebrahimi et al. [30] conducted an adversarial
attack on NMT by employing differentiable string-edit op-
erations. The method of generating adversarial examples
is the same in their previous work [24]. Compared with
Belinkov et al. [29], the authors demonstrate that adversarial
examples in black-box attacks are much weaker than white-
box ones in most cases.
4.4 Attack with Syntactically Controlled Paraphrase
Networks (SCPNS)
Iyyer et al. [88] designed SCPNS for generating adversarial
examples without decreasing the quality of the input se-
mantics. The general process mainly relied on the encoder-
decoder architecture of SCPNS. Given a sequence and a
corresponding target syntax structure, the authors encoded
them by a bidirectional LSTM model and decoded by the
LSTM model. This process was augmented with soft at-
tention over encoded states [114] and the copy mechanism
[115]. Then, they modified the inputs to the decoder, aiming
at incorporating the target syntax structure to generate ad-
versarial examples. The syntactically adversarial sentences
not only can fool pre-trained models, but also improve the
robustness of them to syntactic variation. The authors also
use crowdsourcing experiment to demonstrate its validity.
5 DEFENSES AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS IN
TEXTS
The constant arms race between adversarial attacks and de-
fenses invalidates conventional wisdom quickly [64]. In fact,
defense is more difficult than attack. Currently, there may
be two reasons for the scarcity of defense methods. One is
that a good theoretical model does not exist for complicated
optimization problems of adversarial examples. The other
is that tremendous amount of possible inputs may produce
the targeted outputs with a very high possibility. Hence, an
actually adaptive defense method is difficult. In this section,
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TABLE 6: Instances of some methods in section 3
Method Instance of adversarial example type of
modification
TextBugger
[20]
original: reason why requesting i want to report something so can ips report stuff, or can only registered
users can? if only registered users can, then i ’ll request an account and it ’s just not fair that i cannot edit
because of this anon block shit c’mon, fucking hell. Toxic
modified: reason why requesting i want to report something so can ips report stuff, or can only registered
users can? if only registered users can, then i ’ll request an account and it ’s just not fair that i cannot edit
because of this anon block shti c’mon, fuckimg helled. Non-toxic
multi
Papernot et
al. [21]
original: I wouldn’t rent this one even on dollar rental night. negative
modified: Excellent wouldn’t rent this one even on dollar rental night. positive word-level
DeepWordBug
[22]
original: This film has a special place in my heart. positive
modified: This film has a special plcae in my herat. negative character-level
Alzantot et
al. [23]
premise: A runner wearing purple strives for the finish line.
original: A runner wants to head for the finish line. 86%Entailment
modified: A racer wants to head for the finish line. 43%Contradiction
word-level
HotFlip [24]
original: South Africas historic Soweto township marks its 100th birthday on Tuesday in a mood of
optimism. 57%World
modified: South Africas historic Soweto township marks its 100th birthday on Tuesday in a mooP of
optimism. 95%Sci/Tech
character-
level
iAdv-Text
[25]
original: There is really but one thing to say about this sorry movie It should never have been made The
first one one of my favourites An American Werewolf in London is a great movie with a good plot good
actors and good FX But this one It stinks to heaven with a cry of helplessness. negative
modified: There is really but one thing to say about that sorry movie It should never have been made The
first one one of my favourites An American Werewolf in London is a great movie with a good plot good
actors and good FX But this one It stinks to heaven with a cry of helplessness. positive
character-
level
Text-fool [26]
original: The Old Harbor Reservation Parkways are three historic roads in the Old Harbor area of Boston.
They are part of the Boston parkway system designed by Frederick Law Olmsted. They include all of
William J. Day Boulevard running from Castle Island to Kosciuszko Circle along Pleasure Bay and the Old
Harbor shore. The part of Columbia Road from its northeastern end at Farragut Road west to Pacuska Circle
(formerly called Preble Circle). 87.3%Building
modified: The Old Harbor Reservation Parkways are three historic roads in the Old Harbor area of Boston.
Some exhibitions of Navy aircrafts were held here. They are part of the Boston parkway system designed
by Frederick Law Olmsted. They include all of William J. Day Boulevard running from Cast1e Island to
Kosciuszko Circle along Pleasure Bay and the Old Harbor shore. The part of Columbia Road from its
northeastern end at Farragut Road west to Pacuska Circle formerly called Preble Circle.
95.7% Means of Transportation
multi
Samanta et
al. [31]
original: A sprawling, overambitious, plotless comedy that has no dramatic center. It was probably intended
to have an epic vision and a surrealistic flair (at least in some episodes), but the separate stories are never
elevated into a meaningful whole, and the laughs are few and far between. Amusing ending though.
negative
modified: A sprawling, overambitious, plotless funny that has no dramatic center. It was probably intended
to have an epic vision and a surrealistic flair (at least in some episodes), but the separate stories are never
elevated into a greatly whole, and the laughs are little and far between amusing ending though. positive
word-level
Gong et al.
[32]
original: One of those TV films you saw in the seventies that scared the hell out of you when you were a kid
but still gives you an eerie feeling. No great actors or expensive production but everytime that phone rings
... ... Label 0
modified: One of those TV films you saw in the seventies that scared the hell out of you when you were a
kid but not gives you an considered unnerving. No great actors and/or expensive production but everytime
that phone rings ... ... Label 1
word-level
we describe some relatively efficient methods against adver-
sarial attacks in texts, which can be divided into detection
and model enhancement methods. The former defends by
detecting the inputs, and the latter is by enhancing the
robustness of models.
5.1 Detection of Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are a kind of data with the specific
purpose. Hence, it is worth considering whether detection
is useful against adversarial attacks. Inspired by this view,
a series of works [116]–[120] have been conducted to detect
adversarial examples and perform relatively well in image
domain. In texts, the ways to generate adversarial examples
in some methods will produce misspellings, which could
be a distinctly different feature for use. It naturally comes
up with an idea to detect adversarial examples by check-
ing out the misspellings. Gao et al. [22] used the Python
autocorrect 0.3.0 package to detect the inputs. Li et al. [20]
took advantage of a context-aware spelling check service22
to do the similar work. But experimental results show that
the detection is effective on character-level modifications
and partly useful on word-level attacks, probably because of
the differences on modification strategies. Besides, spelling
check method is also not suitable for adversarial examples
based on other languages like Chinese [95].
Pruthi et al. [121] proposed a word recognition model
applied before DNNs to detect adversarial examples with
misspellings. This model performs well on the character-
level attacks. Although its experiments show that they can
also detect word-level attacks, whether it is useful enough
for the word-level ones is still unknown. For instance,
the example of Alzantot et al. [23] in 6 only changes the
word ”runner” to ”racer”, which is hard for this method
22. https://azure.microsoft.com/zh-cn/services/cognitive-
services/spell-check/
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to judge. Wang et al. [122] proposed a defense method
called Synonyms Encoding Method (SEM), which was for
attacks based on synonyms substitution. The author found
the synonymous sentence for an input by clustering and
marked them with the same label. Their method did not
modify the model or need external knowledge.
5.2 Adversarial Training
Adversarial training [44] is a widely used approach to resist
adversarial attacks in image domain [44], [123]. Researchers
mix adversarial examples with the original ones as a dataset
for training to enhance the models’ tolerance of adversar-
ial examples. In texts, adversarial training is also used in
some works [20], [22]–[24], [124]–[126] as a defense method
against adversarial texts. However, this method fails in the
work of [23], mainly because of the different ways to gener-
ate adversarial examples. The modifications of the others are
insertion, substitution, deletion, and replacement, while the
attack in [23] makes use of the genetic algorithm to search
for adversarial examples.
Over-fitting is another reason why adversarial training
is not always useful and only effective on its corresponding
attack, which has been confirmed by Tram‘er et al. [127] in
image domain, but it remains to be demonstrated in texts.
On the other hand, the accuracy of detection on adversar-
ial examples increases, while the ability on original ones
decreases in the re-training model by adversarial training.
Hence, how to improve the performance of adversarial
training is an open question waiting to be solved.
5.3 Other Methods Against Adversarial Examples
Except for adversarial training, there exist other ways to im-
prove the robustness of models to resist adversarial attacks.
Goren et al. [128] formally analyzed, defined, and quantified
the notions of robustness of linear learning-to-rank-based
relevance ranking function [129], aiming at improving the
robustness to small perturbations of documents in the ad-
versarial Web retrieval setting. They adopted the notions
of classification robustness [12], [130] to ranking function
and defined some related concepts, such as pointwise ro-
bustness, pairwise robustness, and a variance conjecture.
To quantify the robustness of ranking functions, Kendall’s-
τ distance [131] and top change were used as normalized
measures. Finally, the empirical findings supported the va-
lidity of their analyses in two families of ranking functions
[132], [133].
Li et al. [134] proposed a method to enhance the ro-
bustness of NLI systems by the multi-head attention [135].
The authors determined what kind of robustness they
wanted. Then, the external knowledge (e.g., wordnet [136])
was added to the attention mechanism, which was linked
to structured embeddings. Experimental results show that
there is a significant improvement on defense against ad-
versarial examples when the knowledge is added to the
cross-encoder in their models. Another advantage is that
the method does not need extra parameters and any model
with attention units can use.
5.4 Summary of Defense Methods
Although defense methods have achieved better results on
their corresponding works, there also exist some limitations.
The strategy of spelling check performs not well on de-
tecting word-level and sentence-level adversarial examples.
Adversarial training exists an over-fitting problem and it
may not work in facing with a new attack method. Model
enhancement may be the chief defense strategy in the future,
but it is still under exploring and has many difficulties, such
as the choice of loss function and modifications of models’
structure. In Table 7, we compare the three defense meth-
ods from efficiency, prospect, and extendibility. Except for
spelling check in NLP, other two methods have been used
in image, audio, text, etc. They also have higher prospects
than spelling check which has great limitations.
TABLE 7: Comparisons of defense methods in texts from
extendibility and prospect
method extendibility prospect application
Spelling check low low [20], [22], [121]
Adversarial training high middle [20], [22]–[24],
[124]
Model enhancement high high [128]
6 TESTING AND VERIFICATION
Like traditional security issues, adversarial attacks and de-
fenses are constantly changing. New adversarial attacks
are proposed and then followed by new countermeasures
which will be subsequently broken [137]. Hence, the formal
guarantees for the behavior of DNNs are badly needed to
break this loop, but it is a hard job. The technology of
testing and verification helps us deal with this problem
from another point. Testing is to use test cases to discover
bugs in the models, and verification is to ensure the normal
operation of the models under certain conditions. Both of
them are important ways to improve the robustness of
DNNs to defend against adversarial examples.
In this section, we first introduce testing and verification
methods in image domain, and those in texts are described
later. Even though testing and verification methods in image
domain have not been applied to texts, but their ideas can
be used in texts like FGSM and adversarial training.
6.1 Testing in Image Domain
With the increasing use of DNNs in security-critical do-
mains, it is very significant to have a high degree of trust
in the accuracy of models, especially in the presence of
adversarial examples. The confidence of models’ correct
behavior is derived from the rigorous testing in various
scenarios. More importantly, testing is helpful for under-
standing the internal behavior of the network, contributing
to the implementation of defense methods. In the following
part, we survey the approaches for testing DNNs from
testing criteria and test case generation.
6.1.1 Test Case Generation
Pei et al. [139] designed a white-box framework DeepXplore
to test real-world DNNs with the metric of neuron coverage.
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TABLE 8: Comparison with other four methods
— DeepConcolic [138] DeepXplore [139] DeepGauge [140] DeepTest [141] DeepCover [142]
Type of input normal data or coveragerequirements normal data normal data normal data normal data
Number of input* single or multiple multiple multiple multiple multiple
Method of test
generation* concolic optimisation-based optimization-based greedy search symbolic execution
* Values of these two items come from the work in [138].
They leveraged differential testing to catch the differences of
corresponding output between multiple DNNs. In this way,
the generated adversarial examples have a high neuron cov-
erage. Hence, DeepXplore could trigger the majority logic of
the model to find out incorrect behavior without manual
efforts. It performs well in the advanced deep learning
systems and finds thousands of corner cases which make
the systems crash. However, the limitation of DeepXplore is
that if all the DNNs make incorrect judgments, it is hard to
know where is wrong and how to solve it.
Wicker et al. [143] presented a feature-guided approach
to test the resilience of DNNs in the black-box scenario.
The authors treated the process of generating adversarial
cases as a two-player turn-based stochastic game. Over the
process of this gameplay, adversarial examples are found
with the asymptotic optimal strategy based on Monte Carlo
tree search (MCTS) [144] algorithm, and the authors can
evaluate the robustness of DNNs via this process.
Sun et al. [138] presented DeepConcolic, which was the
first attempt to apply traditional consoles testing method to
well-known DNNs. DeepConcolic iteratively used concrete
execution and symbolic analysis to generate test suits, aim-
ing at reaching a high coverage and discovering adversarial
examples by a robustness oracle. The authors also compared
with other testing methods [139]–[142] shown in Table 8. In
terms of input data, DeepConcolic could start with a single
input or coverage requirements as inputs to achieve a better
coverage. For the performance, DeepConcolic could achieve
higher coverage than DeepXplore, but run slower than it.
6.1.2 Testing Criteria
Different from single neuron coverage [139], Ma et al. [140]
proposed a multi-granularity testing coverage criteria to
measure accuracy and detect erroneous behavior. They took
advantage of four methods [44], [71], [73], [106] to generate
adversarial test data to explore the new internal states of
models. The increasing coverage shows that the larger the
coverage is, the more possible the defects are to be checked
out. Similar work is conducted by Budnik et al. [145] to
explore the output space of models via an adversarial case
generation approach.
Kim et al. [146] proposed a new test adequacy cri-
terion called Surprise Adequacy for Deep Learning Sys-
tems(SADL) to test DNNs. This method measures the dif-
ferences between inputs and training data, which is the
foundation of the adequacy criterion. Experimental results
show that adversarial examples can be well judged by this
method. On the other hand, it also improves the accuracy of
DNNs against adversarial examples by retraining.
6.2 Verification in Image Domain
Researchers think that testing is insufficient to guarantee
the security of DNNs, especially with unusual inputs like
adversarial examples. Edsger W. Dijkstra once said, “testing
shows the presence, not the absence of bugs”. Hence, verification
techniques on DNNs are needed to study more effective
defense methods in adversarial settings. But verification of
the robustness of machine learning models to adversarial ex-
amples is still in its infancy [147], resulting in few researches
on related aspects. We group the verification methods into
three aspects in the following part: search-based, global
optimization, and over-approximation approaches.
6.2.1 Global Optimization Approach
Katz et al. [148] presented a novel system named Reluplex to
verify DNNs based on Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)
[149] solver. They transformed the verification into linear
optimization problems with Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)
[66] activation functions. Reluplex is used to find adversarial
inputs with the local robustness feature on the ACAS Xu
networks [11], but it fails on large networks with the global
variant.
For ReLU networks, Tjeng et al. [150] regard the ver-
ification as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
[151] problem. They evaluated robustness to adversarial
examples from minimum adversarial distortion [152] and
adversarial test accuracy [153]. The runtime of their work
is faster than Reluplex [148] with a high adversarial test
accuracy, but the same limitation is that it remains a problem
to scale it to large networks.
Unlike existing solver-based methods (e.g., SMT), Wang
et al. [154] presented ReluVal by interval arithmetic [155] to
guarantee the correct operations of DNNs in the presence
of adversarial examples. They repeatedly partitioned input
intervals to find out whether the corresponding output
intervals violated security property. By contrast, this method
is more effective than Reluplex and performs well on finding
adversarial inputs.
6.2.2 Search-based Approach
Huang et al. [156] proposed a new verification framework
based on SMT to verify neural network structures. This
method relies on the discrete search space and analyzes the
output of each layer to search for adversarial perturbations,
but the authors find that SMT theory is only suitable for
small networks in practice. On the other hand, this frame-
work is limited to many assumptions and some functions in
it are unclear.
Different from other works, Narodytska et al. [157]
verified the secure properties on the binarized neural net-
works(BNNs) [158]. They leveraged the counterexample-
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guided search [159] procedure and modern SAT solvers to
study the robustness and equivalence of models. The inputs
of models are judged whether they are adversarial examples
by two encoding structures Gen and V er. This method can
easily find adversarial examples for up to 95 percent of
considered images on the MNIST dataset [160], but it works
on the middle-sized BNNs rather than large networks.
6.2.3 Over-approximation Approach
Gehr et al. [161] introduced abstract transformers, which
could get the outputs of CNN-based models with ReLU. The
authors evaluated this approach on a pre-trained defense
network [162] to verify its robustness. Experimental results
showed that the FGSM attack could be effectively pre-
vented. They also made some comparisons with Reluplex on
both small and large networks. The stare-of-the-art Reluplex
performed worse than it in the verification of properties and
time consumption.
Weng et al. [163] designed two kinds of algorithm to
evaluate lower bounds of minimum adversarial distortion,
via linear approximations and bounding the local Lipschitz
constant. Their methods can be applied to defended net-
works, especially for adversarial training, to evaluate their
effectiveness.
6.3 Testing and Verification in Texts
Unlike various works in image domain, the number of
related papers on testing and verification in texts is two
and one respectively. We introduce them below and make
comparisons with the similar works in image domain.
Testing. Blohm et al. [91] generated adversarial examples
to discover the limitations of their machine reading compre-
hension model. Through several ways for testing, including
word-level and sentence-level in different scenarios [51], the
authors found that their model was robust against meaning-
preserving lexical substitutions, but failed in importance-
based attacks. Besides, experimental results show that some
other attributions (e.g., answer by elimination via ranking
plausibility [164]) should be added to improve the per-
formance. Cheng et al. [165] proposed a projected gradi-
ent method to test the robustness of sequence-to-sequence
(seq2seq) models. They found that seq2seq models were
more robust to adversarial attacks than CNN-based clas-
sifiers. Meanwhile, they addressed the challenges caused
by discrete inputs, making it possible to apply methods in
image domain to texts.
Compared with testing methods in image domain, re-
lated works in texts are very rare. Except for quantity, testing
in [91] and [165] is different from others in image domain.
Works in texts are to judge the robustness of models by
observing its performance of the test cases. However, similar
approaches in image domain (e.g., DeepXplore [139] and
DeepGauge [140]) have considered the neuron coverage of
the models, which is worth trying to be applied to texts.
Besides, testing can be used in other NLP tasks, such as text
classification, machine translation, and natural language
inference.
Verification. Jia et al. [166] presented certifiably robust
training by optimizing the Interval Bound Propagation (IBP)
upper bound [167], which could limit the loss of worst-case
perturbations and compress the living space of adversarial
examples. Their method was provably robust to the attacks
with word substitutions on IMDB and SNLI. As same as
testing, the works of verification in texts are little either.
In theory, some methods in image domain can be applied
to texts, which are for enhancing the robustness of models,
not for the data or others. For example, methods based on
SMT are likely to be used in texts, although they need to be
confirmed by experiments.
7 DISCUSSIONS
In the previous sections, detailed descriptions of adversarial
attacks and defenses in texts are given, enabling readers to
have a faster and better understanding of this aspect. Next,
we present more general observations and challenges of this
area.
7.1 Findings
From the papers we reviewed, there are many findings, and
we summarize some of the major ones below.
Use of misspellings. The motivation by using mis-
spellings is similar to one pixel attack [72] in image domain,
which aims at fooling target models with indiscernible per-
turbations. The ideal situation is that attackers only change
one or two characters to generate adversarial texts for fool-
ing the models just like HotFlip [24]. Actually, people have
to increase the number of modified characters to get more
adversarial examples, while character-level modifications
can result in misspellings with a high probability. Mean-
while, the study shows that humans are very robust against
misspellings in written language [111], so that misspellings
are used as a special kind of modifications to generate
adversarial examples in texts.
Transferability. Szegedy et al. [12] first found that ad-
versarial examples generated from a neural network could
also make another model misbehave by different datasets,
which reflects their transferability. Therefore, attackers can
train a substitute model and utilize the transferability of
adversarial examples for attack, when they have no access
and query restriction to the target models. Recently, studies
show that different types of adversarial attacks have dif-
ferent transferability [106], [168]. For instance, adversarial
examples generated from one-step gradient-based methods
are more transferable than iterative methods [106], but their
attack abilities are opposite. Hence, the generation of ad-
versarial examples with high transferability is not only the
premise to carry out black-box attacks, but also a metric to
evaluate generalized attacks.
Generation Process. We observe that many methods
mainly follow a two-step process to generate adversarial
examples in texts. The first step is to find important words
with significant impacts on the results of classification,
and then homologous modifications are used to generate
adversarial texts.
Distribution. In addition, we find that there is a pro-
nounced imbalance in the distribution of research efforts:
among the 47 papers in texts we collected, three of them
tackle testing and verification, only one paper specializes
in defense, and the remaining is about attacks. We can see
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that defense methods account for only a small portion of
research in texts and these researches make up only a small
part of all areas (in Figure 2). Hence, great attention should
be paid to the security problem caused by adversarial exam-
ples.
7.2 Challenges
In terms of adversarial attacks, there are two major chal-
lenges in texts:
(1) Adversarial attacks in texts are not practical due
to the absence of attacks in physical NLP systems.
Currently, the majority of studies on adversarial texts
is about theoretical models and rarely related to
practical applications. We have used the adversarial
examples presented in recent works [20]–[26], [31],
[32] to attack ParallelDots like Figure 1, but most of
the adversarial examples are ineffective and can be
correctly classified. Only a few samples successfully
fool this system, which means that the transferability
of these adversarial examples is not good. For the
physical NLP systems, we have no access to them
and query may be limited sometimes, so that trans-
ferability is the main choice for attacking these phys-
ical applications. Hence, the power of transferability
is the key factor for practical attacks.
(2) There do not exist well-performed adversarial exam-
ples which can fool any DNNs, which is the so-called
universality. Although Wallace et al. [169] find input-
agnostic sequences which can trigger specific classi-
fications to generate universal adversarial examples,
these sequences have an impact on the readability
of inputs and the generated samples are offensive in
nature.
In terms of evaluation, there exists two main scarcities:
(1) Most of researches evaluate their performances of
adversarial attacks by success rate or accuracy. Only
a few works [22], [20] take speed, scale, and efficiency
into consideration, although they only list the time
spent of the attacks. A question of whether there
is a relationship among the scale of dataset, time
consumed, and success rate of adversarial attacks
is still unknown. If there exists such a relationship,
the trade-off of these three aspects may be a research
point in the future work. Currently, a related study
[170] of speed in adversarial examples have been
conducted in image domain. Besides, the experimen-
tal results on different datasets are various when the
attack method is same. Whether the type of data may
affect adversarial attacks is worth pondering.
(2) Various methods have been proposed to study ad-
versarial attacks and defenses in texts, but there is
not a benchmark for them. Researchers use different
datasets (in Section 2.7) in their works, making it
difficult to compare the advantages and disadvan-
tages of these methods. Meanwhile, it also affects the
selection of metrics. Currently, there do not have an
exact statement that which metric measure is better
in a situation and why it is more useful than others.
Some comparisons have been made in Textbugger
[20] with several metrics. The best one in this work
may be only suitable for it, but ineffective in other
works.
In terms of quick start in this aspect, it is short of
an open-source toolbox (e.g., AdvBox [171] and cleverhans
[172] in image domain) for the research on adversarial texts.
The toolboxes in image domain integrate existing represen-
tative methods of generating adversarial images. People can
easily do some further studies by them, which reduce time
consumption for repetition and promote the development
in this field. Compared with those in image domain, there is
only one visual analytics framework proposed by Laughlin
et al. [173] in texts. But it is lack of diverse attack and defense
methods, which can be integrated to make it more powerful.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This paper presents a survey about adversarial attacks and
defenses on DNNs in texts. Although DNNs have a high
performance on a wide variety of NLP tasks, they are inher-
ently vulnerable to adversarial examples. Hence, people pay
a high attention to the security problem caused by adver-
sarial examples. We integrates almost existing adversarial
attacks and defenses focusing on recent works in texts. The
threat of adversarial attacks is real, but defense methods
are few. Most existing works have their limitations like
application scenes and constraint conditions. More attention
should be paid to the problem caused by adversarial exam-
ple, which remains an open issue for designing considerably
robust models against adversarial attacks.
In the future, researches may study adversarial examples
from the followings: As an attacker, designing universal
perturbations can be taken into consideration as it works in
image domain [74]. The universal adversarial perturbations
on any text are able to make a model produce incorrect judg-
ment with a high probability. Moreover, more wonderful
universal perturbations can fool multi-models or any model
on any text. On the other hand, the work of enhancing
the transferability is meaningful in more practical black-
box attacks. Besides, the combination of optimization-based
and transferability-based methods is another viable way
like the work in [174]. On the contrary, defenders prefer
to completely revamp this vulnerability in DNNs, but it is
no less difficult than redesigning a network. Both of them
are long and arduous tasks with the common efforts of
many people. At the moment, the defender can draw on
methods from image area to text for improving the robust-
ness of DNNs, e.g., adversarial training [162], adding extra
layer [175], optimizing cross-entropy function [176], [177],
or weakening the transferability of adversarial examples.
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